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The elections which were held under the Representation of Natives
Act in 1937, 1942 and 1948 warrant examination for two reasons.
Firstly, because they were the only elections ever held in South
Africa on a national level in which blacks took part. And secondly,
because the holding of free elections in a country which denied the
electorate many of the other basic freedoms such as freedom of move-
ment, of speech and of assembly was an anomaly in itself and ought
to be examined for this reason alone.
The first of these elections was held in 1937. The electorate
were the male black tax payer over the age of eighteen who, by an
elaborate voting system, were to elect their representatives to the
three institutions where they could make their wishes known to the
government. The Cape voters, who had been removed from the common
roll» could now elect three white representatives to the House of
Assembly. The whole of the black electorate could vote for the
four senators, as they could for the members of the newly formed
third body, the Natives Representative Council. Twelve of the
sixteen black members of that Council could be elected (four were
nominated by the government). The Council's purpose was to consider
and to comment on all new legislation on black affairs before it was
tabled in either the House of Assembly or the Senate.1
The main emphasis of this paper will be on the elections to the
Natives Representative Council (N.R.C.), because it was this aspect
of the Representation of Natives Act which the Africans themselves
emphasised, both in their newspapers and in their political organisations
To understand the importance which the black electorate attached to
the election of the N.R.C., it must be made clear that although the
functions of the Council as laid down in the Act made it a totally
advisory body, it was nevertheless felt to have the semblance of a
third chamber of Parliament. This idea that the N.R.C. might one
day assume the guise of a parliament for blacks was first postulated
by Smuts (although this was later disputed by him) and assiduously
repeated by both black and white politicians.2 Newspapers published
for black readers repeatedly referred to the Council as a "black
parliament" throughout its fifteen years of existence. A National
Party spokesman even gave as one of the reasons for the necessity
for the Council's abolition that such a "parliament" would be a danger
to white domination.3
An indication of the importance which councillors attached to
their membership of the N.R.C. was the addition of the latters
"M.R.C." behind their names in the same way that members of Parliament
were "M.P.'s".4 Both Dr. Moroka, who was a councillor and African
National Congress (A.N.C.) president, and A.P. Mda, who was Congress
Youth League president in the 1940's, emphasised the status attached
to being a member of the N.R.C. They held the opinion that far more
status was attached by the blacks to the councillors than to the heads
of any of the black organisations of that time, including the A.N.C.5
The electoral process itself was a very elaborate one, due mainly
to the attempts by the authorities to circumvent the fact that the
vast majority of the electorate was illiterate. No attempt has been
made here to analyse the whole of this in detail which would entail a
paper on its own; certain aspects of it only, when considered
important, are however explained.
Voting was by a show of hands and the actual result of the vote
was recorded presumably in writing and placed in a sealed envelope
and handed to the relevant authorities, so that the vote was in effect
a secret one. No whites were allowed to be present during the
proceedings of the voting units.6 The results of the first election
were published in detail in the Government Gazette. Unfortunately
this procedure was not followed in the same detail in the 1942 and
1948 elections, and no accurate figures are accordingly available for
these two elections, making statistical comparisons of any kind very
difficult. Although many of the results were published in the
newspapers, the figures given differed considerably from each other
compounding the difficulties in this connection.
The elections had two separate stages: the first was what was
called nomination day, when the electoral units nominated their
candidates to the Council. These candidates were often local notables
who, receiving no support from anyone else, would then withdraw. The
advantage of nomination day for the more successful candidates lay in
the fact that they could gauge their support well before the day of
voting and also recognise who their most important opponents were.
This was of importance because the size of the electoral areas made
it difficult and expensive for candidates to canvass the whole it it
unless compelled by reason of the paucity of their support. J.D.
Rheinallt Jones was not considered as having canvassed unusually
extensively in having travelled 8 000 kms. through the Transvaal and
Orange Free State in March 1937 when standing as a senatorial candidate.7
Besides their largely having travelled through the electoral areas
themselves, all the candidates appointed black political agents to
canvass those rural areas which they themselves could not cover in an
attempt to change the political outlook of the rural voting units.8
At times the N.R.C. candidates would align themselves with others (there
were two rural seats for each of the four Provinces), or with the
senatorial candidate for that area or his agent, and act as a team.
This enabled them to interview and address a greater audience than
would otherwise have,been possible in the available time.9
The candidates who worked as a team were not necessarily both
elected. In 1937, Dube, who was the most influential African in Natal
at this time, stood with W.W. Nhlovu as rural candidates and both
succeeded. In 1942, however, Dube abandoned Ndhlovu and gave his
support to Albert Lutuli. Dube retained his seat but Lutuli was
defeated, as was Ndhlovu. The seat was won by George Champion. It
was felt by the candidates that the support of a national figure like
Dube was a distinct advantage in the elections but from results like
those above it seems obvious that this alone did not ensure any
candidate's election.10
Thomas Mapikeia can be taken as an example of the type of candidate
who successfully contested a seat in the 1937 election. His election
manifesto was not based on any clear ideological or political outlook.
The most that can be said for it was that it had a mildly liberal tone
with an emphasis on matters of social welfare.11 Mapikeia was a
founder of the A.N.C. and a leading politician in Bloemfontein.; he
had taken part in some of the fruitless attempts by blacks to interest
the British government in their plight and had led the agitation against
instituting passes for black women. At the time of his election he
was prominent in the Advisory Boards Congress and above all he had been
one of the leaders in the recent protest against the Hertzog legis-
lation.12
Nearly all of the successful candidates at this election had been
the leaders of the 1936 campaign against the abolition of the Cape
franchise. Were they elected because of their prominence during the
campaign? A puzzling feature of the black opposition to the 1936
legislation was the absence of any mass protests. Why were there no
riots or strikes? A political organisation had after all been
specifically formed for this purpose, namely, the All African Convention
(A.A.C.). If the African masses had protested they would not have
been leaderless but they did not protest. It may be concluded from
this that only that small section of the black population that could
have benefitted from the pre-1936 situation was prepared to protest
against the change. Those who had no direct stake in the status quo,
by far the greater part of the electorate, remained quiescent. If
there was no mass support for this attitude then it must be concluded
that it was their past record in general rather than their recent
opposition to the 1936 legislation which was instrumental in these
persons being elected. Godlo, in fact, did not believe that a
recommendation by the A.A.C. would be of much value in the 1937 election
and there is also some evidence that these candidates were unpopular in
the Cape. It ought not to be overlooked that the A.A.C. had been
singularly unsuccessful in its effort in 1936 and thus to have taken
part in its campaign could hardly have been an advantage.
The A.N.C. also endeavoured to get its candidates elected, although
often the nominations were the same as those for the A.A.C. This was
probably due to the fact that neither of these organisations had clearly
defined policies and that the prominent black politicians who were
relatively well-known were limited to a small number of men. John Dube,
R.V. Selope Thema and R.H. Godlo were all members of both the A.A.C. and
the A.N.C. Godlo was, in addition, the head of the Advisory Boards
Congress, which endeavoured to get its nominees elected to all the urban
seats allocated to the Council. The disorganised state of both the
A.N.C. and the A.A.C. makes the influence which these organisations had
on these elections, even more difficult to ascertain. All that can be
said with some certainty is that the Africans who were elected to the
Council in 1937 were, on the whole, proven leaders of long standing.
They were more probably elected on their own "track records" than because
they were the chosen candidates of any political party. In any event
those elected were regarded "as the accepted mouthpiece of Africans in
their respective chambers" by both the A.A.C. and the A.N.C.14
The Communist Party had also put up candidates in the 1937 elections,
They were Hyman Basner for the Senate and Edwin Mofutsanyana.for the
N.R.C. Unlike the other candidates, and parties, the Communist Party
had a definite policy which it never attempted to disguise. It had
little success in the elections. Basner attempted to get elected
apparently without appealing to the chiefs in the rural units. His
resultant massive defeat, polling only 66 234 votes against Rhe.inallt
Jones' 404 447 can thus not necessarily be attributed to any lack of
support for the Communist Party.15
Edwin Mofutsanyana, the other Communist candidate, was a fairly
prominent black leader who at the time of these elections was also
general secretary of the Communist Party. He was the only head of a
political party ever to stand as a N.R.C. candidate. Mofutsanyana
was not a dynamic leader and it was perhaps unfortunate that he was
chosen to represent the Communist Party not only in these elections
but also in the elections of 1942 and 1948.16
Mofutsanyana himself attributes at least part of his success at
the polls to harassment at the hands of anti-Communist location super-
intendants during his campaigns. At Reitz, for example, he was
prevented from using a hall to address an election meeting and at
Messina the police even prevented him from entering the black location.
However, from his own account it seems that he generally found a way
round these difficulties and succeeded in addressing a number of
meetings.1? There were thus other factors which prevented Communist
Party candidates from succeeding at the polls in 1937 although the
extent to which their defeat can be attributed to them is uncertain.
Besides Basner and Mofutsanyana there were three candidates in
the 1937 elections whose views at that time can be described as being
more radical than those of the other candidates. They were George
Champion, Josiah Gumede and W.G. Ballinger, the husband of the
successful Cape Eastern candidate, Margaret Ballinger. Both Gumede
and Champion played down these views in their manifestos. Champion
stated that he was now "trying to act within the law and be respec-
table".^ Gumede mentioned neither socialism nor his visit to Russia
in his manifesto, although he exaggerated the scope and importance of
his other visits to Europe.19 Thus neither Champion nor Gumede, if
one cares to judge from their election manifestoes, considered that
an emphasis on radicalism would get them any votes. Both were defeated.
Dube had 311 638 votes cast in his favour, W.W. Nhlovu got 1£1 647,
Champion 154 609, and Gumede trailed after Champion. William Ballinger
found that his nomination for senator was so little supported that he
withdrew his candidature.20
Those successful in the 1937 elections of the parliamentary
candidates were whites who professed liberal attitudes such as Rheinallt
Jones, the director of the South African Institute of Race Relations
and Margaret Ballinger. Among the blacks were many of the foundation
members of the A.N.C. like W.W. Nhlovu, John Dube, Thomas Hapikela and
R.V. Selope Thema. Both the founder of the Advisory Boards Congress,
A.M. Jabavu,and the then president, R.H. Godlo, were chosen to represent
the urban areas. The Transkei had chosen three of its most prominent
members to represent it; Charles Sakwe, chairman of the Transkei Native
Voters Conference and influential on the Cape Native Voters Association;
Jeremiah Moshesh, a member of the Transkeian General Council since 1918,
and Eleijah Qamata, who had gained more votes at the poll in the
Transkei than any of the other candidates.
The two remaining members of the 1937 N.R.C. for rural areas were
Richard Baloyi, a landlord and bus owner active in A.N.C. circles and
Bertram Buxton Xiniwe, chairman of a large electoral committee in the
Kingwilliamstown area and shortly to be Cape A.N.C. president. A.J.
Sililo, the councillor for the urban Natal seat, was not elected until
1940, due to the anomolous position of the urban voting unit in that
province.21
The electoral units responsible for the election of the three
members of the Council who represented the urban areas were the
advisory boards. The suspicion with which the Native Affairs Depart-
ment tended to regard the urban Africans found expression in the
unwillingness of its officers to approve the formation of these boards.
However, not only was the Department tardy in this respect but the
municipal authorities allowed only a very small number of blacks to
register as urban dwellers.22 Some magisterial districts had only
one taxpayer registered in a whole area.23; Durban had twenty-seven
voters from some 70 000 Africans, Johannesburg had 719 and Benoni
1 653. * The situation was absurd but in the case of the Transvaal
and Cape elections not crucial because so long as the total number of
voters for the urban seat was 2 000 Africans a candidate could still
be chosen. It soon became apparent, however, that the whole of Natal
did not contain 2 000 Africans who were registered in urban areas and
thus no member of the N.R.C. for urban areas could be chosen until the
Act had been amended.
D.L. Smit, the Secretary for Native Affairs, maintained that it
was a simple matter to transfer a man's tax registration (which
determined his voting area) from a rural to an urban area. But in
actual practice this must have been difficult because in 1937, of a
total of 1 408 362 voters, only 14 865 in the whole of the Union
outside the Transkei were registered as urban taxpayers.25
The black population which the authorities were so unwilling to
acknowledge as urban voters had to be placed in another category for
voting purposes and this resulted in large numbers of urban Africans
being placed in the voting units known as electoral committees.
These electoral committees consisted of large numbers of urban Africans,
especially those centred in Johannesburg and the Witwatersrand area
generally, as well as those blacks who had been detribalised and lived
outside small towns and on farms throughout the country. It is note-
worthy that even in 1937, before the large-scale industrialization of
the post-war years had taken place, that these detribalised blacks
comprised nearly half of the total voting population outside the
Transkei, namely 597 105 voters.26
The electoral committees were thus filled on the one hand by the
politically well-informed Africans of the urban areas (the Orlando
Electoral Committee, for example, at one stage had Dr. Xuma as its
chairman) and on the other hand by people who had never before par-
ticipated in politics or elections, the blacks in the white farming
areas. In those areas in which were the more politically aware blacks,
the electoral committees became effectively mere extensions of the
urban vote. Because such a great number of urban Africans were placed
in these committees, it meant that the urban African had the greatest
influence on the election. In this election it was not the number of
units who voted for any candidate which mattered, but the actual number
of voters.27
The rural committees were quickly dominated by the only educated
segment of the rural black population, the teachers. It was they who
explained to the often illiterate voters.the implications of the
elections and guided them in their voting. The provincial educational
authorities viewed this with some alarm; they threatened to dismiss
all such teachers on the grounds of their participation in politics,
and their attitude was fully endorsed by the Department of Native
Affairs. This came too late to affect the 1937 election but the
teachers were expressly forbidden from participating in any future
elections, except as voters.28
In 1940 the Representation of Natives Act was amended and the
chairmen of the electoral committees could now be appointed by the
local Native Commissioner; he could also explain to the voters the
way these committees were meant to function. This was an attempt by
the government to rid the electoral committees of the influence of the
teachers who it presumably felt were partly to blame for the election
of 1937 resulting in a black Council comprising all the better-known
black politicians who had put themselves up for election. This
amending legislation, however, still provided that no white person
could be present at the actual voting. Since the vote was still
secret, it is doubtful whether the government succeeded in this attempt
at "guiding" the voters. The government on the one hand was intent
upon ensuring that the politically aware section of the rural community
was unable to dominate the electoral proceedings (that domination it
wanted to preserve for itself) but on the other hand by preserving the
secrecy of the voting procedure the government seemed to want to ensure
that an element of consensus was preserved.29
A cardinal event which took place during the tenure of the first
Council was the outbreak of war in 1939. It led to the most important
of the debates in which the councillors participated: the merits of
black participation in the Defence Force. The N.R.C. was divided
between those who asked for an amendment to the Defence Froce Act to
include black soldiers on terms of equality with whites, and those
councillors who disagreed, contending either for unconditional
participation or for complete non-participation. It became clear to
those who disagreed that the electorate was totally behind the motion
of equality. The motion was proposed by R.H. Godlo and its main
opponents were T. Mapikela, A.M. Jabavu and Elija Qamata. Godlo
himself thought that public opinion would lead the opponents of his
motion to lose the next election.30
The outbreak of war had also led to a change of government in
South Africa. Oan Smuts, who took over as Prime Minister from J.B.M.
Hertzog, centred his policy to blacks on attempts to improve their
social and economic conditions. He stated, however, that these
improvements would be dependant on the country's financial situation.
As his government was a war-time administration, there was not a great
deal of money available and little was done during the war to provide
social services for blacks. Politically Smuts was in favour of some
liberalisation of the administration being carried on but at what he
termed "a modest pace and determined by (white) public opinion".31
In January 1942 Smuts made a speech before the South African
Institute of Race Relations. As van der Byl, the Minister of Native
Affairs, later wrote, Smuts was in the habit of giving an audience
what it wanted to hear and on this occasion said in his speech that
in his opinion segregation had failed. He actually only meant that
segregation as a policy had failed to keep Africans out of the cities
and that perhaps another method ought to be tried to achieve this.
However, the phrase "segregation has failed" was taken out of context
and false hopes were raised that the segregation policy had breathed
its last.32
By 1942 the drive to the cities was already under way, mainl
as a result of the economic plight of blacks in the rural areas.3
Economic conditions in the urban areas, however, could by no means
be regarded as satisfactory. In the latter months of 1942, thirty-
four strikes involving black workers took place. In nearly ewery
one of these strikes the workers were pressing for higher wages and
an improvement in their working conditions. The dissatisfaction
which the African worker was expressing was probably not only the
product of war-time economics but also the result of the reformist
ideas expressed at this time by the pronouncements of Allied statesmen
and in documents like the Atlantic Charter.3^ Thema's statement in
the N.R.C. that the men fighting up North did not expect to come back
to the same conditions which had prevailed before they had left the
country, was yet another expression of what, by 1942, seems to have
been commonly felt among the blacks, namely that conditions must
improve in the future.35
It was probably against this background that it had become clear
to William Ballinger that the limit of voluntary concessions had been
reached and that in future Africans would have to fight and make
sacrifices for what they wanted.36 This seems also to have been
clear to the electorate because the men returned in the 1942 elections
were by and large of a more radical turn of mind than those of 1937.
This applied, however, mainly to the blacks returned to the N.R.C.
rather than to the Senators and black elected members of the House of
Assembly.
The second elections were scheduled to take place on 4 November
1942. As has been mentioned, \/ery little official information was
published on this election, the main sources being newspapers and
some private correspondence. There is some doubt as to whether
all the councillors even stood for re-election: according to William
Ballinger, Mapikela did not seek re-election but (rather surprisingly,
considering his former attitudes) urged his supporters to vote for
the Communist Party candidate, Edwin Mofutsanyana.37
The Communist Party in 1942 had originally put forward three
candidates for the elections. They were E. Mofutsanyaya, A.M.
Mabela and one Lekgetho, who toured the rural areas together in an
attempt to gain the rural vote.38 in an article in the Guardian
mention is made of a pamphlet issued by a black organisation, the
"African Election Committee", which urged blacks not to elect com-
munists because the Communist Party was multi-racial and could thus
never speak for black interests alone.39 Although this article
was addressed to the voters of advisory boards, this aspect of the
election campaigns of the Communist Party candidates was an important
one. It is evident from the campaigns of these candidates that
racial divisions were ignored and that white communists campaigned
on behalf of their black comrades. It is also evident that among
some sections of black opinion, African communists were regarded as
nothing more than puppets of Moscow.40 The multi-racialism of the
Communist Party and its known association with the U.S.S.R., as well
as an impression that the Party was dominated by whites, probably
contributed to its lack of success at the polls. As in 1937,
electioneering by the communists was again accompanied by intimidation
from the authorities. This time it was Moses Kotane who was arrested
after making a speech on behalf of the Communist Party candidate.41
Although the communists were as unsuccessful in 1942 in the
N.R.C. elections as they had been in 1937, their white senatorial
candidate for that election, Hyman Basner, now won a decisive victory
over the incumbent, J.D. Rheinallt Jones. Basner won by the large
majority of 332 798 votes to 237 199. Only three of the Reef
advisory board, not one local council and only eleven out of fifty-
eight chiefs had voted for Rheinallt Jones. There were various
contributory factors which may help in understanding his defeat.
Rheinallt Jones had initially been uncertain whether he should seek
re-election and entered the campaign at a relatively late stage.
He had visited only seven districts and had spoken at only seven
meetings during his entire campaign. Another possible reason for
his poor showing in the rural areas was that during his five years
as senator he had apparently told his black constituents that he was
in favour of abolishing the black reserves. This was probably
misunderstood by them to mean that he was in favour of their land
being, taken away from them and could not have increased his popularity
among them.42
Basner had left the Communist Party in 1939 over the war issue
but was nonetheless considered to have taken a radical stance in his
campaign. Lord Harlech, the British High Commissioner, gave it as
his opinion that the election of Basner was a sign of impatience with
the liberal outlook of Jones among a large section of black opinion,
and that the authorities viewed it as a gesture of revolt and dis-
satisfaction. 43
It is difficult to see Basner in quite such a radical light
when taking into account his subsequent statements in the Senate.
He stated, for example, that he was in favour only of a qualified
franchise for blacks. His conduct in the Senate when he refused
at times to follow parliamentary discipline seems not so much the
result of his radical turn of mind as plain bad manners.44 Basner
was thus not as much the radical as he was pictured at the time of
his election. That Rheinallt Jones lost the election was more due
to slack campaigning than to the ideology of Hyman Basner, especially
when one takes into account that all the other returned parliamentary
candidates were of a liberal outlook. On the other hand it should
be said that the area in which Basner was elected did include the
Witwatersrand, which had a vast number of those very voters who were
at the forefront of the industrial unrest of 1942; this may have
been an important element in Basner's success. Without firm
statistical evidence such conclusions can, however, only be tentative.
Basner's view can, however, still be regarded a more militant one
than the average liberal black elected politician.
The A.A.C. had also put up certain candidates at this election,
all of whom apparently were defeated. Dr. Moroka, who won a seat
in 1942 and was the A.A.C.'s treasurer, was not, it would seem, put
forward by the A.A.C. as one of their official candidates. Joe
Matthews was of the opinion that the defeat of their candidates turned
the Convention against the N.R.C. and that this was the reason that
that organisation, in 1943, adopted a resolution to boycott the
Council. A.P. Mda disagreed with this view and said that the
resolution was passed as a matter of principle rather than pique at
the A.A.C.'s lack of success at the polls. He did, however, admit
that the status of the members of the Council was resented by certain
sections of black opinion and may have been the reason for the N.R.C.
being singled out in this way.45
The attitude of the A.N.C. to the 1942 elections was quite .
different to both the A.A.C. and the Communist Party. Before the
holding of the 1941 annual conference at Bloemfontein, it appeared
that Congress would put up its candidates as the other organisations
were doing. James Calata, the secretary-general of Congress, had
in fact already asked the various branches of Congress to submit
nominations for the forthcoming elections.46 At the conference
itself, however, a decision was taken not to sponsor any candidates,
although individual Congress members could vote for whom they liked.47
This ruling was made at the suggestion of Xuma, at that time its
present-general, who did not want the A.N.C. to publicly support
candidates for the Council (in case of their defeat), but who would
nevertheless privately have preferred that certain candidates succeed
at the polls. Xuma felt that the election of both Moroka and Z.K.
Matthews, in particular, would be of benefit to Congress. He thought
that the election of these two candidates would enable Congress to
guide the activities and attitudes of the Council. After the
election he received a congratulatory letter from James Calata
expressing his satisfaction that Congress had succeeded in placing
its candidates on the Council without appearing to do so.48 Xuma
also made a personal appeal to members of the newly elected Council
to take a more active interest in the A.N.C, an appeal to which
Paul Mosaka initially responded, making it quite clear that he was
receptive to influence by Xuma as to what was to be done in the
N.R.C.49
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Other A.N.C. members who were elected in 1942 were the two most
radical members of the first Council, and its leaders, R.V. Selope
Thema and R.H. Godlo. Three of the councillors who had not supported
Godlo's motion asking for equality in the Defence Force were defeated
and replaced by more radical men, these being Thomas Mapikela, A.M.
Jabavu and Elijah Qamata. Richard Baloyi was replaced by the more
outspoken James Moroka. In Natal George Champion was elected,
defeating W.W. Ndhlovu. As has been pointed out, Ndhlovu was now
no longer supported by John Dube in his fight for election. It is
not certain why this was so but Ndhlovu did display some racialistic
attitudes in certain Council debates of which Dube clearly disapproved,
In addition to this, Champion himself was now standing for a rural
seat and not an urban one as had previously been the case. The
rural seats, as has been noted, had a large number of urban workers
amongst whom Champion had been carrying out extensive trade union
work since the lifting of his banning order.50
Many of the men elected in 1942 were to rise to positions of
eminence in the A.N.C. Champion and Z.K. Matthews were to become
provincial presidents of Natal and the Cape respectively and Moroka
became president-general in 1949; others like Xiniwe, Godlo and
Thema held office or were part of the national executive during the
time they were members of the N.R.C.51 Thus the second N.R.C.
consisted of a majority of A.N.C. members. It has been noted that
Zuma's view was that the A.N.C. could now influence the views of
the Council. This was indeed the case but Congress did not influence
the Council in the way that a political party usually did, by guiding
its members on policies they should pursue once they had been elected.
The reason was because Congress was at all times reluctant to adopt
any kind of firm ideology in case this should imperil its always
shaky facade of unity. To continue to regard itself as the mouth-
piece of all African opinion meant that it had to forego any definite
political outlook. Inkundla Ya Bantu was of the view that the only
reason the councillors did indeed look to the A.N.C. for advice was
because it was the only completely African body of any standing.52
The years between the holding of the second election in 1942
and the third in 1948 were the most crucial of the Council's history.
As has been noted, the new members of the N.R.C. and those former
members who had been returned were of a more militant turn of mind
than those of 1937. They showed this not only in their speeches
in the Council but also in their activities outside. It was in
this period that it became apparent that although they were permitted
to hold election meetings, political activities were not regarded
with the same equanimity by the government once the elections had
been held. Both Paul Mosaka and Thema were arrested in this way:
Mosaka when he took an active part in the Alexandra bus boycott of
1943 and Thema in Cape Town during the Anti-Pass Campaign.53 In
addition, freedom of speech at political meetings outside the election
period was frowned upon. In 1944 Mosaka had referred to the govern-
ment as a "Nazi government" at a meeting of his African Democratic
Party in Kroonstad. He was immediately warned by the authorities
that such "subversive" conduct would not be tolerated.54 Freedom
of assembly was also at this time not permitted after the passing
of Proclamation 131 of 1945 which prohibited black gatherings of
more than ten people.^5
The only activities that the black councillors were permitted
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to undertake as part of their duties was to act as liaison in some
cases of dispute. Mosaka assumed this role in the case of the Orlando
squatters when he negotiated on their behalf.56 On no account,
however, were the councillors permitted to act in this capacity in
more explosive situations. In 1940 the councillors offered to reduce
tension during riots in the Bethanie location by entering that location
(for which they had to seek permission) and talking to the inhabitants,
but the Native Affairs Department refused to allow them to do so.57
There was a marked contrast between the freedom of speech and the
freedom of movement granted the councillors during electioneering
and during their term of office.
On Dube's death in 1946 a by-election was held in Natal and his
seat was won by Albert Lutuli, the man whom Dube had supported in 1942
as a Natal rural candidate. Lutuli's chief opponent in this by-
election was Henry Selby Msimang. Msimang was supported by George
Champion, who was attempting to assume the Natal leadership left
vacant by Dube's death. Lutuli, however, won by a massive majority
of 132 808, gaining 231 926 votes to Msimang's 99 118.58
The most far-reaching influence on the 1948 elections was the
launching of the Anti-Pass Campaign by the Communist Party in November
1943. Xuma gave this campaign his support in 1944 and then became
its conference chairman and president. In spite of a great deal of
effort by Xuma, the campaign proved a failure. A number of councillors
were also involved in the campaign, the most prominent among them being
Thema, who was arrested for unlawful assembly when he led a procession
in Cape Town. The final conference on the Anti-Pass Campaign was held
in June 1946 at which it must have been obvious to all that the campaign
had been a dismal failure.59
The only possible source of influence left to the leaders of. the
Anti-Pass Campaign was the N.R.C., a meeting of which was scheduled
for August 1946. Between June and August of that year a meeting of
the national executive of Congress was held in Bleomfontein. It seems
that Thema, a member of the A.N.C. executive who had recently been
jailed for his efforts on behalf of the campaign, was understandably
most adament that the matter should be taken further through the
offices of the N.R.C. As a leader of the campaign in Cape Town he
must have been humiliated by the refusal of Hofmeyr, the Acting Prime
Minister, and Piet van der Byl, the Minister of Native Affairs, to
receive him or to even see the petition. By pursuing the matter
through the Council he probably thought that the government would be
compelled to take some notice of his efforts and not dismiss them in
such a cavalier manner. It is not known exactly what was discussed
at this meeting but the general opinion seems to have been that Thema
was eager to take the matter further by somehow involving the N.R.C.
It was probably here that it was decided to stage a formal protest at
the next N.R.C. session.60
Cyclostyled letters were then sent by Xuma informing the coun-
cillors of the A.N.C. decision to adjourn the next meeting of the
Council as a form of protest.6! According to Dr. Bokwe, it took a
great deal of persuasion before unanimity on this directive by the
councillors was reached.62
Secrecy concerning this decision was, of course, essential, but
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if the Native Affairs Department had been more alert they would have
realised that something unusual was afoot from the mere fact that
whereas in previous years over one hundred separate motions were often
received, for the opening of this ninth session of the Council only
twenty-two were tabled.63
At the caucus meeting held prior to the opening of the session,
Matthews asked Dr. Moroka if he would present the motion for adjourn-
ment, thus catapulting Moroka into instant acclaim as the mover of
what was later termed the "freedom resolution". It is surprising
that Thema himself did not present the motion but from Moroka's
remarks it seems as if the councillors were unsure as to what the
government's reaction would be; perhaps Thema felt that as he had
so recently been imprisoned for his activities, presenting such a
motion would unnecessarily draw the authorities attention to him yet
again.64
On the 15 August the N.R.C. met for the opening of its ninth
session.. The adjournment motion was passed almost immediately. It
was supposed by those who did not know the true state of affairs
(which included all the parliamentary representatives of the blacks),
that the adjournment was a spontaneous action prompted by the gold
miners' strike which had coincidently occurred at the same time."
This decision of the N.R.C. to suspend its operations indefinitely
until the government decided to abolish its policy of discrimination
was the way in which the adjournment resolution was couched and in
this form received widespread support. In October 1946 Xuma called
a special conference in Bloemfontein to discuss the N.R.C.'s action.
Over four, hundred people were said to have attended the meeting.
The number present are attested by a number of sources and are of
interest in that the annual conferences of Congress did not attract
a quarter of this number. It seems that the action of the N.R.C.
had a large measure of support and did give Xuma and the other black
leaders some of that prestige which they may have lost through the
failure of the Anti-Pass Campaign.66
At this meeting it was decided to allow the councillors to attend
further meetings of the Council convened for the purpose of receiving
the government's reply to the adjournment resolution but at the same
time called upon the voters to embark upon a boycott of all elections
under the Representation of Natives Act of 1936.67 The decision to
boycott the elections was achieved with some difficulty, nobody wanting
an unconditional boycott except Lembede and the Congress Youth League
and even they were not unanimous in their opinion on the matter.68
The talk of boycotting the elections was nothing new. Besides
the decision on the matter taken in 1943 by the A.A.C., the matter
had also been discussed as early as 1936, when the legislation had
originally been passed. What made the boycott so attractive to the
Congress Youth League at this particular time was the impact created
by the boycott by the Indian people of the Asiatic Land and Represen-
tation Act. The ultimate objective of the African boycott movement
was full citizenship rights. As Matthews pointed out, for the
committed boycotters the question of whether they would ultimately
succeed or fail was irrelevant, it was an act of faith. On a more
practical note it was hoped that if the boycott campaign grew it would
eventually develop into a vast civil disobedience movement.69
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What had been overlooked by the boycotters, Paul Mosaka wrote,
was that the struggle of the Indian people was not at all "passive".
It was an active act of resistance by which they voluntarily under-
took to show the government the hardships they were prepared to
Undergo in order to demonstrate the intensity of their hatred for
this piece of legislation and the strength of their determination
to resist it. Xuma and Thema had had to abandon the Anti-Pass
Campaign because it had failed to elicit from the African the \/ery
qualities which made the Indian movement a success - organisation,
a strength of will and the determination to undergo hardship for the
sake of one's principles. There was no reason to believe that the
boycott movement would be any more successful than the Anti-Pass
Campaign had been, something which Xuma and most of the national
executive (especially those who were also members of the Council),
were quick to realise.70
In 1947 Gordon Hemming, a black elected member for the Transkei
of the House of Assembly, died and the boycott resolution was put to
its first test. Douglas Buchanan, a liberal of similar outlook to
Margaret Ballinger, stood unopposed for the seat. During his electoral
campaign, Buchanan had been constantly heckled by his audience and
after his election he decided to test the strength of the boycott
movement and sent a voting paper to the 2 375 voters in his constituency.
Only 144 of these papers were returned stating that they were in
favour of the boycott.71 At the head of the boycott movement in
the Transkei was Govan Mbeki, secretary of the Transkeian Organised
Bodies, who had obviously found it an easy task to organise the
Transkeian voters into a comparatively effective boycotting instrument
but it was evident that even in the case of such a small number of
voters sufficient unanimity could not be obtained to ensure that
no-one at all voted for Buchanan, a step which alone would have made
the boycott successful.72
The representatives of the Africans in Parliament were not in
favour of the boycott. Basner went so far as to state at a meeting
of the Transvaal A.N.C. that he thought the boycott resolution "so
silly" he did not think that grown men would waste a whole day dis-
cussing it. He added that if the boycott resolution was passed by
the meeting, then he would not stand for re-election in 1948. Basner
did not stand for re-election. It was at this meeting that William
Ballinger was attacked by Ramohanoe, the president of the Transvaal
A.N.C. for wishing to contest the Transkei seat vacated by the death
of Hemming.75 Ballinger withdrew his candidacy. Donald Molteno,
the Cape Western representative of the Africans in the House of Assembly,
had accompanied Buchanan on his tour during the latter1s election
campaign in the Transkei and had thus had first hand experience of
the boycott. As a.result both of this tour and of the heckling which
Molteno himself experienced at election meetings, he began to voice
some doubts on the suitability of whites representing blacks in
Parliament and at one stage even contemplated resigning. He did not
give this as a reason for his decision not to seek re-election, but
it must have played some part.7**
Molteno's decision not to seek re-election disturbed the liberal
representatives who felt that this vacancy might, given the climate
of black opinion in his constituency, leadto the seat falling to a
Communist Party candidate. This was the reason that Douglas Buchanan
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who had won the Transkei seat in 1947, decided to contest the Cape
Western seat in 1948 instead.75
The boycott resolution of the A.N.C. had placed some of the
blacks1 parliamentary representatives in a quandary but did not have
the same effect on the black members of the N.R.C. None of the
incumbents of that body ever contemplated resigning before the election
or not seeking re-election in 1948. This was the result not only
of the lack of influence of the A.N.C. at this time on its members
but also of the importance which the councillors attached to the
N.R.C. as the only direct link between the government and the Africans.76
At the A.N.C. conference in December 1947 the delegates voted
sixty-seven against seven adopting the resolution of the national
executive to intensify the boycott campaign.77 But by January 1948 .
the A.N.C. had thought better of its boycott decision and had now
decided to participate in the elections on a "boycott ticket", the
basic reason being that the A.N.C. had found itself quite unable to
carry out the boycott, even on a small scale like the advisory board
elections. By "boycott ticket" was meant that the members of the
N.R.C. should, as far as possible, be returned in the 1948 elections
so that they could continue to discuss reform measures which the Smuts
government was now proposing to introduce.78
An added complication in the 1948 elections was that the white
voters were also participating in an election in that year, an election
which some influential blacks thought might well result in a change of
government, and that this election was taking place before the
elections under the Representation of Natives Act. It was felt that
an aggressive boycott campaign would embarrass and weaken the present
more liberal government and lead to its downfall thus helping the
National Party into power.79
The A.A.C. did not participate in the 1948 elections. The
Trotskyite elements under Tabata and his followers who had taken over
that organisation were advocating a total boycott and did not veer
from their original 1943 decision. Furthermore, it was probably due
to their influence that the total poll in the Cape Western constituency
was only 53%. Tabata's followers would obviously have refrained from
voting in spite of Sam Kahn's efforts to get his constituents to the
polls.80
The attitude of the Communist Party to the 1948 election was
initially ambivalent. On the one hand it was clear that the most
radical section of African opinion favoured the boycott but at the
same time they did not want to pass up the opportunity of getting
their own people elected to the N.R.C. and to Parliament.81 The
Communist Party had certainly tried to implement the boycott resolution
as far as it could do so but when this was seen to be impossible,82
they then put up their own candidates for the 1948 elections thus
turning against the A.N.C. resolution, to which both Moses Kotane
and J.B. Marks, as members of the national executive, had agreed,
which had advocated the return of the 1942 elected councillors. In
its arguments for this decision, the Guardian pointed out firstly,
that the vote was a right which ought not to be voluntarily suspended
and secondly, that the black voters must realise that at this juncture
a boycott policy could only play into the hands of the National Party
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(the white election had at this time been won by them). They could
abolish the franchise by pointing out that the blacks themselves were
advocating a boycott and therefore did not want it. 8 3
The Communist Party had put up three black candidates for the
1948.N.R.C. elections, Edwin Mofutsanyana, Alpheus Maleba and A.S.
Damane. Both Damane and Mofutsanyana were members of the Party's
central committee.84 They were the same men who had been unsuccessful
in 1942, while the second of these, Mofutsanyana, had been an unsuc-
cessful candidate as far back as 1937. It seems that the Communist
Party hoped that it was not its candidates as much as its policy
which would ensure electoral victory.
The elections of 1948 were apparently as well supported (in spite
of the boycott), as the other elections had been.85 The Transvaal-
O.F.S. seats, for example, had twenty candidates for the one urban
seat and fifty-two for the two rural seats. Besides the incumbent
members of the N.R.C., men like L.K. Nhlabati, a Bioemfontein Congress
organiser, and J.S. Mpanza were nominated in this constituency. As
in previous elections, the Communist Party again experienced difficulty
during this one: Michael Harmel was assaulted by the location super-
intendant when he attempted to address a meeting in support of Edwin
Mofutsanyana.86
The policy of the A.N.C., together with the reputation and
publicity that the members of the N.R.C. had got from their adjourn-
ment resolution of 1946, ensured the re-election of almost all of
them in 1948. The only exception was Natal where Champion, by this
time in firm control of the Natal A.N.C. presidency, succeeded in
ousting L.P. Msomi from the urban seat and getting Henry Selby Msimang
elected in his stead.87 The 1948 election results indicated the
confidence of the electorate in the retiring members of the Council
and their support for the policy pursued by them.88
The main interest in these elections lay in the fact that firstly,
a Communist Party member, Sam Kahn, was standing for Molteno's seat
and secondly, that all the other seats of the parliamentary represen-
tatives (including Molteno's seat) were being contested by National
Party candidates. This situation had come about because the
National Party majorities in the House of Assemby and the Senate
were so small that it would have been useful to them to win additional
seats, besides given them a mandate, if they had won, for their policy
of apartheid.
The National Party secretary in Johannesburg, some would think
perhaps a little optimistically, approached Xuma to gain his support
for that Party's candidates for the 1948 election.89 The National
Party candidate in the Transvaal-O.F.S. was one van Rensburg who
opposed William Ballinger. Xuma reacted to this request by writing
a personal letter to all the electoral units asking them to vote for
Ballinger and in addition reminding them that the ballot was secret.90
Presumably this was because the black electorate probably did not
feel at ease voting against a candidate openly sponsored by the white
party in power. In spite of Xuma's efforts, fully twenty-five
electoral units did vote for van. Rensburg, including Alexandra
Township.91
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In Natal J.M. van Rooyen stood against Edgar Brookes. Van
Rooyen had approached Champion and the Natal A.N.C. in an attempt
to gain their support for his candidature. His political agent
was a former member of the N.R.C., W.W. Nhlovu, who sat on the
Council from 1937-1942. It seems that the National Party government
even applied pressure to the Zulu chief, Cyprian, by making it clear
to him that his paramountcy was dependant on him voting for van
Rooyen rather than for Brookes.92 in a roneoed election newsheet
signed by E.G. Jansen as leader of the National Party in Natal, it
was stated that van Rooyen was the candidate who supported the
government and that the government wanted the electorate to show
that it approved of the government's plans for them and wanted to
see them carried out.93 They wanted the African voters consent to
apartheid.
In. the Transkei W.H. Stuart was opposed by J.D.L. Kruger, who
stood for the National Party. The only three-cornered election was
in the Cape Western constituency where D.M. Buchanan, a liberal,
stood against Sam Kahn of the Communist Party and A.P. van der Merwe
of the National Party. The Communist Party candidate won this seat
by a comfortable majority - 3 780 for Kahn, 754 for Buchanan and 194
for van der Merwe, who lost his deposit.9^ Kahn was the first
communist member of the House of Assembly, chosen by the blacks to
represent them. This was a development of importance in that there
was no doubt that in the one constituency where the electorate had
been given a choice between a liberal, a member of the National Party
and a member of the Communist Party, they chose the Communist Party
member.
It is of some significance that whereas a white Communist Party
member was acceptable as a parliamentary representative, no communist
ever became a member of the Representative Council. The reason for
this was most probably that the parliamentary representatives were
chosen because of their ideology and what this represented to the
voters, while the councillors were chosen for themselves. If J.B.
Marks, the leader of the Gold Miners Union in the 1946 strike, had
stood as a candidate in 1948 instead of Edwin Mofutsanyana, he might
wery well have been elected.
The government attempted to use both the parliamentary represen-
tatives and the N.R.C. to aid it in its domination of the black
population. The parliamentary representatives themselves admitted
that the only useful work they did in parliament was when they
attempted to either postpone proclamations or to add some slight
amendment to existing or new legislation.95 The result of their
efforts was that they used their expert knowledge of black affairs
in indicating to the government by these means what would be tolerable
to the people whom they represented and what would have to be revised
in order to avert any possible black-white confrontations. This was
probably also the purpose of giving all new legislation to the N.R.C.
first, before it went to either the Senate or the House of Assembly.
If the councillors vehemently protested against, then the government
had an indication of the way it would be received by the black
population.
As has been noted, the black elected parliamentary representatives
were all of them staunchly liberal in 1937. By 1942, with the
election of Hyman Basner, although by no means a radical, his election
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can certainly be seen as a swing to the left, at least in the Wit-
watersrand area. The uncertainty concerning their attitudes towards
the blacks was emphasised in the wavering views expressed by these
representatives during the 1947 boycott campaign. The election of
William Ballinger {who held similar views to Basner) in the Transvaal-
O.F.S. seat in 1948, and finally in that same election the victory
of.Sam Kahn, a member of the Communist Party, saw the final
repudiation of liberalism by the black electorate. It is true that
parliamentary representatives like Margaret Ballinger and Edgar
Brookes, who held liberal views, were never defeated but on the other
hand they were never opposed by candidates of more militant views.
The aspect of consent to domination which these elections represented
reached its culmination in the 1948 election which saw the National
Party put forward candidates who espoused the policy of apartheid.
They all lost their deposits.
The members of the N.R.C. were, in 1937, the representatives of
the politically unsuccessful method of pleading with the authorities
to ameliorate the conditions under which the black electorate lived,
rather than asking for any specific politcal rights.
From 1939 demands for equality began to be heard and the 1942
election results clearly indicated that the black electorate was now
repudiating the politicians who held the traditional view for more
militant representatives who openly asked for political equality.
Their demands culminated in the showdown of 1946 when equality was
no longer asked for but demanded. The stand of the Council was
fully endorsed in 1948 when nearly all of them were returned by the
black electorate.
To the National Party government, which came into power in 1948,
the views of the Council proved to be of inestimable value because
through their attitudes they were able to gauge with great accuracy
the temper of the black people over whom they were to govern.9** The
elections had shown that the blacks had categorically rejected the
policy of apartheid, were demanding equality and were a clear presage
of the turbulant black-white confrontations of the years to come.
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